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ABSTRACT
The sense of taste has served as a governing metaphor for aes-
thetic discernment for several centuries, and recent philosophical 
perspectives on this history have invited literal, gustatory taste into 
aesthetic relevance. This paper summarizes the disposition of taste 
in aesthetics by means of three stories, the most recent of which 
considers food in terms of aesthetics and its employment in works 
of art. I conclude with some reflections on the odd position that taste 
has achieved in the postmodern art world, and I make a case for the 
often unnoticed role that bodily senses have in the apprehension 
of art.
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There is a mild insult in English that is sometimes directed at a per-
son of low cultural sensibilities: “Your taste is all in your mouth.” 
As an insult it is pretty tame, but the philosophical assumptions that 
give it wit run deep. First is the recognition that “taste” refers both 
to the mouth sense and to aesthetic preferences. Second is the im-
plicit recognition of the old sense hierarchy that considers the bod-
ily senses of taste, touch, and smell inferior to the distance senses 
of vision and hearing. It also plays upon the idea that the notion of 
good taste can take on a snobbish aspect. Thus this little insult cap-
tures aspects of three stories about taste that will shape my reflec-
tions on the ways that reference to this sense permeates aesthetics.
APPROACHES TO TASTE: THREE STORIES
The first and most familiar story concerns the foundation of mod-
ern aesthetics during the Eighteenth Century, the so-called “centu-
ry of taste,” during which time taste provides not only a metaphor 
but the very conceptual framework for philosophical investigations 
of beauty.1 I begin by reviewing this well-known account in some 
detail because it contains contestable points to reconsider later.
Literal or gustatory taste—by which I mean the mouth sense 
that requires smell and touch as well—seemed an apt model for 
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appreciative responses to beauty for several reasons. First, refer-
ence to a sense foregrounds the immediacy of aesthetic response. 
Francis Hutcheson, an influential predecessor for both Hume and 
Kant, observed that finding something beautiful, like register-
ing pleasure and pain sensations, depends neither on choice nor 
on rational decision. “By the very frame of our nature the one is 
made the occasion of delight and the other of dissatisfaction.”2 The 
“frame of our nature” indicates that just as human beings are nor-
mally equipped with all five senses, we are all capable of sensing 
beauty. Thus the metaphor of taste adopts a democratic address to 
people of all societies and times (a point of dispute that will come 
up shortly). 
Secondly, taste is demonstrably trainable. Just as the ear can 
learn to recognize a tonic chord, so the tongue can learn to distin-
guish subtleties of flavor. This trainability means that taste can be 
cultivated, paving the way for normative standards and a distinction 
between good and bad taste. Of course, all of our senses are educa-
ble, though taste stands out for its presumptive ties to pleasure and 
displeasure. Eighteenth-century theories widely analyzed beauty in 
terms of pleasure, as Hutcheson’s remark indicates. It was (and still 
is) assumed that, in contrast with other senses, taste rarely operates 
without liking or disliking what is sampled. Therefore, as our gus-
tatory sense is cultivated, our pleasures also develop; and by exten-
sion of the metaphor, so does our capacity to discern beauty.
Other aspects of literal tasting also lend themselves to aesthetic 
uses, such as the requirement of first-hand acquaintance. One can’t 
make a judgment about the beauty of an object without seeing or 
hearing it, just as one can’t decide if a soup is well-seasoned with-
out sampling it. Taste of both sorts requires a kind of immersion 
in its object, to invoke another metaphor. The acquaintance prin-
ciple is challenged in contemporary theory, but as far as I know it 
was taken for granted in the Eighteenth Century. To my mind it re-
mains one of the most important marks of the aesthetic, and I shall 
return to it later. 
I suspect another factor also fortified the use of the taste met-
aphor. The flavor properties of food and drink that we respond to 
were, and to a degree still remain, somewhat mysterious. Certainly 
when aesthetics was developing, little was known about the chemis-
try of flavor perception. This makes literal taste ideal for thinking 
about sensitivity to its elusive cause—that je ne sais quoi—the objec-
tive correlate of beauty that is so difficult to pin down.
Despite the enthusiasm with which gustatory taste was exploit-
ed, modern European theories largely leave literal taste behind, 
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stressing that the sense serves only as a metaphor for aesthetic sen-
sibility. Gustatory taste seems too individual to conform to the nor-
mative standards sought for aesthetic judgments. Kant famously 
declares that liking for canary wine is an example of the agreea-
ble, about which no standards need apply.3 Moreover, literal taste 
is tied to appetite, and the satisfaction of appetite is the wrong kind 
of pleasure, being sensuous, bodily, and “interested” rather than 
contemplative, “disinterested,” and aesthetic. These presumptions 
confirmed the venerable sense hierarchy of western philosophy, 
supporting the idea that only the distance senses of sight and hear-
ing sustain aesthetic standing.4 In 1762, Henry Home, Lord Kames, 
extended that sentiment to include artistic limitations: “The fine 
arts are designed to give pleasure to the eye and ear, disregarding 
the inferior senses.”5 
In sum: the first story about taste, which has dominated our 
historical understanding for three centuries, adopts the gustatory 
sense as a metaphor—but only a metaphor—for aesthetic sensibility, 
recognizes the normativity of aesthetic pleasures, and stresses the 
universal grounds for standards for taste, which ideally unite us all 
in common appreciation. 
THE SECOND STORY: A CRITICAL VIEW
Story number two challenges this happy picture. According to this 
version, which gained currency in the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century, the very concept of taste is an imposition of elite cultur-
al values and an exercise of social power, manifesting political 
anxieties peculiar to the modern period. With the rise of middle 
class wealth in modern Europe and the weakening of older class 
divisions that had served to stabilize social relations, the task of 
taming divergent sensibilities fell to taste. Developing the aesthet-
ic preferences of each individual is a kind of socialization—mak-
ing communities harmonious by corralling pleasures such that 
they converge. According to this analysis, philosophies of taste 
select an idealized image of a privileged, educated person (man, 
actually), who is held to represent the best of human nature and 
whose preferences should guide others.6 Tellers of the second sto-
ry emphasize the times—and they are not infrequent—that theorists 
demean peoples from cultures not their own. Thus those who en-
dorse the first story obscure the preferences of different nation-
alities, classes, genders; and they occlude the recognition of such 
differences by asserting as the norm the aesthetic refinement of a 
socially privileged group. 
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The sociological studies of Pierre Bourdieu support this second 
story. He maintains that both literal and aesthetic taste preferenc-
es are elements of the same forces, summed up in the term “hab-
itus,” which includes social class, economic position, education, 
and other determinants that influence the ways we understand and 
experience the world. By his way of thinking, the gustatory and the 
aesthetic uses of taste are virtually inseparable: “The dual mean-
ing of the word ‘taste’. . . [reminds] us that taste in the sense of the 
‘faculty of immediately and intuitively judging aesthetic values’ is 
inseparable from taste in the sense of the capacity to discern the 
flavours of foods which implies a preference for some of them.”7 
But those preferences divide rather than unite. Kant’s prescribed 
disinterested pleasure, for example, represents a contemplative, 
detached attitude possible only among people wealthy enough for 
leisure, ignoring those who adopt a “taste of necessity.”
Just as the first story is evident in my opening insult, aspects of 
the second story have also entered popular discourse. I recently re-
ceived a gift of a wine glass etched with a quote attributed to cultur-
al critic Susan Sontag: “Rules of taste enforce structures of power.” 
The insult and the inscription are amusing, but they also demon-
strate that both of these philosophical positions have a certain cur-
rency outside of academia.8
Perhaps what the second story best illuminates is why phi-
losophy has a history at all—a question that ought to be puzzling 
because it is the usual conceit of philosophers that they address 
matters of perennial concern and not just those that arise in spe-
cific historical circumstances. Yet clearly there are times when cer-
tain philosophical issues come into notice with particular urgency. 
In eighteenth-century Europe, questions of human subjectivity be-
came especially pressing not only because of changes that socie-
ties were undergoing, but also because of the spread of empiricist 
perspectives that displaced objectivist theories with a conception 
of beauty—and values in general—as a type of pleasure rather than 
an independent quality belonging to certain objects. As Luc Ferry 
puts it, “With the concept of taste the beautiful is placed in relation 
to human subjectivity so intimate that it may even be defined by 
the pleasure it provides, by the sensations or sentiments it evokes 
in us.”9
Placing pleasure at the center of a theory of value creates formi-
dable difficulties, the chief of which is to avoid the pitfalls of rela-
tivism. Hence the driving problem of early modern aesthetics: the 
establishment of a standard of taste. The most famous attempts 
remain those of Hume and Kant, both of whom posited ways to 
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identify beauty with aesthetic pleasure (though Hume did not have 
that term at his disposal) and at the same time to regulate its norms. 
These shifts in ideas about beauty renewed with vigor the ancient 
puzzle that Socrates posed to Euthyphro two millennia before: is 
something valuable because we take pleasure in it, or do we take 
pleasure in it because it is valuable? Even when it comes to posi-
tions wrapped in a social agenda—and the second story is doubtless 
correct to point that out—the Euthyphro question still commands 
attention. 
A THIRD STORY: VINDICATING GUSTATORY TASTE
There is a third story now gaining ground in philosophy that of-
fers a different assessment of the literal sense of taste. Whereas 
Bourdieu would lower the notion of aesthetic sensibility to the lev-
el of gustatory taste, this third story seeks to elevate gustatory taste 
and claim a place for it within the aesthetic. While modern theo-
ry took literal taste as its guide to illuminate the nature of the aes-
thetic, the third story does the reverse, considering the nature of 
the aesthetic to elucidate the operation of gustatory taste and to 
argue that this bodily sense should be granted aesthetic standing. 
While there are plenty of theorists who still hold out for the tradi-
tional distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic senses, there 
are others—myself among them—who maintain that the experienc-
es of eating and drinking admit an aesthetic zone of their own.10 
To understand why gustatory taste has gained philosophical in-
terest in the Twenty-First Century, we need to note some theoret-
ical shifts of our own era that have brought the physical and the 
mental closer together. For some time, the familiar distinction be-
tween mind and body has been challenged from a variety of direc-
tions, ranging from feminist critiques of traditional dualisms to the 
discoveries of neuroscience. These scientific shifts have been une-
venly absorbed in aesthetics. As Emily Brady remarks, “It is worth 
noting that, although recent materialist theories of mind have all 
but defeated the mind/body split, this seems to have had little effect 
on aesthetic theory in terms of expanding its attention to the oth-
er senses.”11 While change may be slow, it is nonetheless the case 
that many philosophers now question at least some of the values 
embedded in the traditional sense hierarchy. 
An aspect of this theoretical shift that underwrites the inclusion 
of physical sensations as modes of aesthetic apprehension comes 
from emotion theory—a brief digression that will become relevant 
shortly. Many theories of emotion posit that emotions must be un-
derstood not only as mental events but also in terms of the physical 
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disturbances that mark them—changes in blood pressure, trembling, 
shortness of breath, and so forth.12 It is now widely acknowledged 
that emotive responses to art, including their bodily aspects, are in-
dispensable forms of understanding and appreciation.13 Weeping 
for Anna Karenina, gasping as Harry Lime flees through the sewers 
of Vienna, a pounding heart at horror movies—all are bodily effects 
that both manifest and enhance understanding of the artworks that 
provoke them. Recognizing these aspects of appreciation marks 
a dramatic contrast with the views of some mid-twentieth-century 
philosophers who scorned the arousal of emotion as a legitimate 
response to art.14 Challenging the clean distinction between the 
mental and the physical and recognizing the impact of somatic re-
sponses to art also pave the way for blurring the distinction between 
distal aesthetic and proximal nonaesthetic senses, for it legitimizes 
bodily sensation as an aesthetic response. 
Exactly how does this point pertain to taste? There remain some 
thorny issues to resolve before taste is situated on firmly defensi-
ble ground. First, we need to determine what kind of philosophical 
standing taste should be accorded; second, what kinds of aesthet-
ic properties the sense of taste registers; and third, we need to ex-
amine the artistic range that includes the gustatory sense and the 
bodily senses generally. These questions are entangled and hard to 
wrest apart, but they require separate address. I shall discuss them 
more or less in order.
To stake a claim for philosophical attention, gustatory taste 
must shed the commonplace presumption that it resists normative 
standards—ensconced in the maxim “There’s no disputing about 
taste.” Not only is this relativism presumed by the first story—as 
with Kant’s dismissive comment about canary wine and merely 
agreeable sensations—but it was given renewed vigor by the second 
story, which implies the absence of any salient objective qualities 
to which taste is sensitive, ceding the roots of aesthetic proclivities 
to social forces. In fact, however, taste warrants dispute for at least 
two reasons. First, the term “taste” can refer to the properties of ob-
jects (and as such be “objective”) as well as to sensations (“subjec-
tive” experiences).15 If there were no objective pole to tasting, there 
would be no possibility of developing discriminating taste, which 
entails that there is something out there to discriminate. Are these 
seasonings balanced? Is this pepper hot enough? Is this wine ready 
to drink? The possibility of cultivating expert taste is one dimen-
sion of the aesthetic potency of food and drink, as cooks through-
out the ages have understood, and that perhaps is most recognized 
with wine.16
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“There is no arguing about taste” means, at root, that there is no 
accounting for preferences. Supposedly, with food either you like or 
you do not like something, and that’s the end of it. However, there 
are reasons to loosen the presumptive tie between taste sensation 
and preference, that is, between recognizing flavor and liking it. 
Without distinguishing between perception and enjoyment, we can-
not account for acquired taste, when we learn to appreciate a fla-
vor previously disliked. As with the objects of vision and hearing, 
taste can distinguish between properties perceived and the pleas-
ures or displeasures they may or may not arouse, making it not only 
a highly discerning faculty but also one capable of normatively ro-
bust judgments of quality. As Barry C. Smith notes, “while liking 
may be a part of, or an accompaniment to, my experience of tasting, 
it is not part of a food or liquid’s taste. Likes and dislikes may vary 
between individuals but the tastes we like or dislike need not.”17 
Dangerous relativism is forestalled by recognizing that taste regis-
ters properties of objects “out there in the world.” 
TASTE AND AESTHETIC COMPLEXITY
What about the aesthetic range of gustation? This question is rath-
er hard to separate from claims about the artistry of the kitchen. 
Some proponents of the third story about taste often go on to de-
fend cuisine or wine-making as creative art forms. Most have in 
mind haute cuisine, meals that demand attention and discernment 
far beyond the satisfaction of appetite. And the increasing prom-
inence of restaurants with spectacularly inventive chefs corrobo-
rates claims that artistic genius operates in the kitchen as well as at 
the keyboard. The always multi-sensory aspects of eating are ex-
ploited to the hilt at many of these venues, where presentation is as 
important as flavor. Perhaps, therefore, we can say that the success 
of fine cooking is recognized in delicious food just as the success 
of fine art is measured by beautiful works. Pursuing that parallel, 
the appreciative palate can detect a spectrum of subtleties, just as 
the art expert can judge excellence in music or poetry. The com-
parison is apt to some degree, but a defense of taste that solely re-
lies on cuisine as an art form quickly reaches limits. Those limits 
are entailed by the chief criterion for excellence in dining: namely, 
that the meal taste good, for note that discernment here is largely a 
matter of savoring flavors. This may seem an odd critique, but the 
fact is that aiming at pleasure truncates the expressive possibilities 
of any artistic endeavor; moreover, it leaves apologists open to the 
charge that objects of taste do not achieve the same cognitive stand-
ing as objects of vision or hearing, no matter how complicated or 
Carolyn Korsmeyer
27
delicious they may be. The divide between distal and proximal 
senses would persist on the grounds that only the former are ca-
pable of delivering meaning of any depth or complexity. This con-
cern breaks down into two issues: the scope of meaning that objects 
of taste can provide, and whether there are limits to the ways that 
tastes can be deployed to convey those meanings. 
It may seem as if gustatory taste is a sense that delivers pleasure 
and affords conviviality, but is relatively free of any particular cog-
nitive significance. This far from the case, for taste is as cognitively 
complex in its own way as are the other senses. Meaning is evident 
in what we eat and drink, for foods are chosen for their signifi-
cance depending on occasion. This is the case with ordinary dai-
ly fare, where a cup of tea offered to a guest signals hospitality or 
warm soup on a cold day not only produces but also signifies com-
fort. Even routine eating is full of meaning, although when those 
meanings become absorbed into habit they rarely come into notice. 
The import of certain foods is even more obviously the case with 
the fare served at special events: the celebration of a wedding cake, 
the honor marked by raising a glass of champagne, ritual food and 
drink that mark religious traditions and holidays. Moreover, there 
are many foods whose histories constitute important narratives 
that can be summoned to mind with their flavors.18
This brief on behalf of taste has its critics, however. The strong-
est argument against the cognitive richness of the bodily senses 
comes from Roger Scruton, who observes that meanings such as 
comfort, reverence, home, and so forth are largely dependent upon 
learned associations, and the same could be said for their histories. 
As such, it is the context within which tastes are deployed that pro-
vides meaning, not the tastes by themselves. He draws attention to 
the difference between what we experience in a perceived object (of 
taste, of sight), as opposed to what the experience merely reminds 
us of. In this respect, a meal, no matter how fine the occasion, con-
trasts with an artwork such as a painting. Naturally, paintings can 
inspire associations, but they also present whole scenes in them-
selves regardless of the contexts in which they are placed. Scruton 
draws a distinction “between those objects of sensory enjoyment 
which acquire meaning only by association of ideas, and the ob-
jects of sight and hearing, whose meaning can be directly seen and 
heard.”19 While seeing-in characterizes the perception of pictures, 
there is no such thing as tasting-in.20 To illustrate: “A prophet in 
a cave is not something that you can taste in a wine as you can see 
St. Jerome in Titian’s painting.”21 I think that Scruton is largely 
right, although his case is sounder with vision than with the other 
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distance sense, hearing. While it is true that one can hear the sum-
mer storm in Vivaldi’s Four Quartets, could one really do so with-
out the program notes? Music, while perhaps not as dependent 
upon association as taste, still requires a good deal of surrounding 
context for a hearing-in phenomenon to manifest. 
Nevertheless, we must grant that, by and large, we rarely taste a 
subject in a flavor in the same way that we see a village scene or a 
depicted action in a painting. (Sometimes in fact we can, but not as 
a rule.)22 But this need not entail that taste does not function cog-
nitively, both when we eat and in the apprehension of art, only that 
its function is of a different sort than vision’s—which is no surprise; 
the senses operate differently from one another. Here again we can 
take a cue from emotion theory: understanding the triggering ob-
ject of an emotion is, at the very least, intensified by the bodily dis-
turbances it prompts. Emotions, after all, are often felt as bodily 
sensations. I venture to say that the bodily senses are indirectly but 
strongly aroused with much art, including art that appears at first 
only to appeal to sight. The following examples engage not only 
vision, imagination, and cultural familiarity, but also touch, taste, 
and affective visceral response.
Literature, painting, drama, film are art forms with narrative 
content that often depict scenes of eating and drinking. Audiences 
do not literally eat and drink alongside characters, but imaginative 
participation in the lust or enjoyment of eating is commonly part of 
the reception of scenes from films such as Rampopo or Tom Jones. 
The sceptic will scoff that this is not taste at all but vicarious fan-
tasy, but I think what this means is that we are not “tasting-in” in 
Scruton’s sense but intensifying and amplifying dimensions of our 
appreciation by means of sensory imagination, which leads us to 
participate in slurps and swallows almost as though we could taste 
the foods on screen ourselves.23 The intensifying aspects of viscer-
al responses are even more evident when the object being eaten is 
not delicious but horrible. 
Rubens’ painting of Saturn Devouring his Son (1636) depicts 
a huge man with bulging eyes, his teeth sunk into the skin of the 
infant he holds in his arm. Both taste and touch are imaginatively 
summoned by those teeth plunged into the baby’s flesh, as one ap-
prehends the ripping flesh and the terror of the child by experienc-
ing a pang of visceral horror, part disgust, part fascination. Or to 
choose an example from drama: In Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, 
when Queen Tamora learns that she has just eaten the flesh of her 
sons, the reader is likely to experience a small gag of disgust. Horror 
invades the very mouth, intensifying the imagined moment with a 
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sympathetic taste-of the abominable. Without that bodily engage-
ment, synaesthetic, subtle, or even subliminal though it may be, 
one’s grasp of these works would be diminished. It seems that the 
bodily senses are at work covertly even here.24 I do not intend to 
equalize the cognitive yield of the senses, so to speak, but rather to 
point out that they are engaged by art in different ways. The physical 
response—the sensation prompted by imagination—furnishes intense 
immediacy by enlisting one’s very body. It is this phenomenon that 
sustains the importance of acquaintance as a descriptor of aesthetic 
response. One grasps not only that it is, but also how it is—what it is 
like. This sort of thing is more detectable in works that disgust than 
in those that delight or soothe, probably because the disturbance of 
negative emotions is simply stronger than the pleasant ones, sad to 
say, an observation that takes us back to the limits of taste pleasure. 
Artists themselves will be the first to point out that art has nev-
er been constrained by the pursuit of pleasurable experiences. 
Artworks are filled with difficult content, including pain, sorrow, 
suffering, and cruelty—all reminders of the tragedies that fortune 
can dispense. The harrowing and the horrid are as aesthetically 
powerful as the beautiful, but the palate does not tolerate equiva-
lent values. Creative cooks may tease the senses and surprise the 
diner, as with unexpected flavor combinations or dishes that do 
not taste the way the eye anticipates. But unlike the objects of the 
eye and the ear, objects of taste, smell, and touch can sicken and 
kill.25 For this reason, the gauges of success for cuisine (and for 
scents as well) have remained more tied to pleasure than are oth-
er art forms.26 If we focus only on the arts unique to them—cuisine, 
wine, perfumery—the full aesthetic power of the bodily senses is 
apt to be overlooked. For fully exploiting the significance of the 
objects of taste takes us beyond the dinner table. 
The very properties of food that constrain its expressive use in 
cuisine at the same time provide a wealth of meaning in art. Many 
artists now incorporate foods into their performances and instal-
lations. Sometimes that food is meant to be consumed by visi-
tors, manifesting hospitality and greeting. (The works of Rirkrit 
Tiravanija or Felix Gonzales-Torres are well-known examples.)27 
Often, however, food is employed to convey something darker. The 
things we eat and drink are transient; they spoil, mold, and rot, and 
in the end they disgust. Therefore, food lends itself to a sort of nat-
ural symbolism that signals corporeality in its least noble forms. 
Think of Jana Sterbak’s Flesh Dress of 1987 that clad a model in 
gradually rotting meat (not to mention Lady Gaga’s coincidentally 
similar garment of 2010). Many of Damien Hirst’s vitrines present 
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items that might once have landed on a dinner table but are now 
food for maggots. Artists who make such use of foods exploit the 
meanings implicit in decay and putrefaction, in counterpoint to the 
emphasis on savoring that is invoked in the defense of the artistic 
status of cuisine. Indeed, they may deliberately arouse affective 
responses that are the reverse of the satisfaction of appetite, chal-
lenging sensibilities and arousing disgust.28 And this point makes 
us realize that taste has now entered some very strange territory.
A PARADOX OF TASTE
Ironically, the historical circumstances that have recently invit-
ed the bodily senses into philosophical company include changes 
within the artworld that reject the very traditions of aesthetics that 
gave rise to the taste metaphor itself. This immensely complicates 
the assessment of the concept of taste in its present-day aesthetic 
modes. Dominant in the artworld today is a wholesale anti-aesthet-
ic that contests older concepts of art, aesthetic quality, and the very 
idea of “good taste.” Inclusion of edible substances in art often rep-
resents not an embrace of the aesthetic value of the sense of taste 
but rather a rejection of the values that were first elaborated with 
the metaphor. This refusal of the very notion of aesthetic value rep-
resents a shift even more radical than the dissolution of the distinc-
tion between aesthetic and nonaesthetic senses. A recent writer on 
the subject, Luca Vercelloni, suggests that art has so departed from 
aesthetic concerns that taste no longer fits with that agenda: 
Once alienated from aesthetics, the art of the twentieth century 
was no longer the object of collective devotion, and instead be-
came an initiation rite that was to discriminate against the tastes 
of the masses, to challenge people’s ability to comprehend, and 
to mock their primitive sensibilities.29 
I would supplement this observation with what seems to me to 
be a revealing anecdote: At a conference not too long ago, I met a 
distinguished chef and cookbook author who had dined at Ferran 
Adrià’s famous elBulli restaurant (birthplace of so-called molecu-
lar gastronomy). To his disappointment, he did not enjoy his din-
ner. Only half joking, he quipped: “Well, it wasn’t very good as 
food, so I figured it must be art.”
The anti-art, anti-aesthetic movement is not new, but its effects 
on what we can make of the revised concept of taste are a bit hard 
to untangle. Certainly, the rejection of traditional aesthetic values 
in the contemporary artworld amplifies the complications of the 
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third story about taste. In fact, we confront a paradox. In contest-
ing traditional values by means of exploiting the expressive and rep-
resentational range of foodstuffs, artists often rely on the very sense 
hierarchy that is under challenge by those who would argue on be-
half of taste as an aesthetic sense. That is, an artist uses food in 
art because to do so violates the standard sense hierarchy, whereas 
defenders of the third story maintain on fairly traditional grounds 
that taste operates in a truly aesthetic way. The former depends on 
retention of that hierarchy, the latter seeks to dissolve it. So their 
challenges to theoretical tradition pull in opposite directions. Thus 
when food enters the artworld displaying its full expressive capaci-
ty, including the meanings conveyed by decay and rot, the traditions 
of aesthetics are all but abandoned, rendering unclear what kind of 
standing is achieved for the sense of taste and its objects. 
The unsettled position of literal taste within the current artworld 
throws into stark relief the whole question of what the label “aes-
thetic” now amounts to. The term has accrued a variety of meanings, 
some quite vague, but in its formative years theorists were at great 
pains to provide a fairly crisp definition, which they did by contrast-
ing aesthetic pleasure with sense pleasure. At present, many of their 
early stipulations have receded. So what is left of the original posi-
tion that the metaphor of taste captures? I conclude by revisiting the 
first story, assessing again the terms of its dominant metaphor.
The first story compares the literal sense of taste and aesthetic 
taste in terms of discriminative capacity and judgment by means of 
pleasure. Literal taste has discriminative facility quite like the ca-
pacities of vision and hearing, and as far as fine discernment is con-
cerned, taste for both food and art are on a par. If we emphasize the 
meanings that the senses register, then a wider field of apprehen-
sion and appreciation opens. Although aesthetic acquaintance tends 
to be underrated in contemporary theory, reflecting on the bodi-
ly senses confirms its importance by pointing out ways in which 
physical response intensifies appreciation. When we touch we are 
in physical contact with something. What we smell is near enough 
that its molecules enter our nasal passages. The objects of taste are 
literally inside one; our very bodies are palpably changed by eat-
ing and drinking, as well as by deprivation and excess. The bodi-
ly senses by their nature entail experiences of particular immediacy 
and intimacy. Just such qualities render the metaphor of taste high-
ly illuminating and appropriate to describe the allure of artworks: 
the ability of a phrase, a poem, an image, a passage of music, to ac-
quaint us with some emotion, scene, even some truth, in a direct and 
deeply felt way. 
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Emphasizing acquaintance confirms aspects of the early meta-
phor so exploited at the advent of modern aesthetics, tying contem-
porary theory nicely to its roots. At its very inception, “aesthetic” 
introduced a term to describe a zone of knowledge, not general con-
ceptual understanding but felt insight into the distinctive qualities 
and meaning of a particular event or object, as for example when 
vivified in poetic expression. Although the inventor of the mod-
ern term, Baumgarten, became less influential than those who fol-
lowed him, his notion of sense or emotive cognition still describes 
an important aspect of the aesthetic.30 This kind of engagement has 
little to do with sensuous pleasure; it has much more to do with im-
mediate affective understanding, with a specific mode of first-hand 
knowing made vivid by sensation and feeling. (Perhaps I am overly 
wary in wanting to distinguish pleasure from insight. Agamben, for 
example, refers to taste as “pleasure that knows and knowledge that 
enjoys.”31 Nonetheless, I would avoid placing pleasure at the center 
of the concept because of its potential to mislead.)
The fine arts were traditionally understood to appeal to the eye 
and the ear, whose fields of perception seem to offer complexity 
and meaning beyond bodily satisfaction. I have presented some 
speculative thoughts about ways in which the bodily senses oper-
ate even when we do not think they do, including with standard, 
old-fashioned works of art that appear at first only to engage eye or 
ear. Here is where considering the aesthetic capacities of the sens-
es converges with insights from emotion theory. Emotions often in-
volve quite noticeable sensations, evident for example in the queasy 
stomach characteristic of disgust or the sweaty palms of fear. A 
flush of anger or embarrassment is part of recognizing outrage or 
clumsiness, a constricted throat is a constituent of grief, smiles part 
of amusement. The physical sensations of emotive disturbance are 
components of one’s understanding of an object or event. That the-
sis pertains to the arousal of emotions in general, and it applies 
with somewhat greater complexity to the ways that affective arous-
al functions with works of art. Does taste align with such bodily 
engagements with artworks—that is, with artworks that do not di-
rectly make use of foodstuffs? I believe that a case can be made 
that the imaginative arousal of eating sensations often contributes 
to our whole experience of a work, and that activation of the bodi-
ly senses in general can make aesthetic encounters vivid, immedi-
ate, and intimate. Moreover, we can recognize their power without 
utterly breaking down the hierarchy of the senses, which after all, is 
part of our inherited cultural framework and underwrites some of 
the meanings that food lends to the arts as well as to our daily lives. 
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